Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War: Istanbul Talks and the Black Sea Grain Initiative

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was the only wartime arrangement in the Russia–Ukraine war that let Ukrainian agricultural exports leave the Black Sea under a joint inspection regime agreed by both belligerents. It was signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022, brokered by Türkiye and the United Nations, and operated until 17 July 2023, when Russia declined to extend it. Turkish sources cite more than 33 million tons of grain and other food exported; UN figures are close to 32.9 million tons.

The case matters beyond food markets. It shows how a NATO member that holds the keys to the Turkish Straits can act as a channel between adversaries, a theme explored in Is Türkiye a Bridge Between Blocs? NATO Membership, Eurasian Ties and Strategic Autonomy.

Background

Why Black Sea grain mattered

Before February 2022, Ukraine and Russia together accounted for a very large share of global wheat exports, and Ukraine was also a major exporter of maize and sunflower oil. When Russia's full-scale invasion began on 24 February 2022, Ukrainian ports were closed to commercial traffic and shipping insurance became unobtainable. Tens of millions of tons of grain were stranded, and food prices spiked, with import-dependent countries in the Middle East, North Africa and the Horn of Africa most exposed.

Chronology of the diplomacy

How the arrangement was structured

The deal consisted of parallel documents, not a single treaty between Russia and Ukraine:

• An initiative on the safe transport of grain and foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports, concluded by Türkiye, the UN and Ukraine on one side, and by Türkiye, the UN and Russia on the other.
• A separate memorandum of understanding between Russia and the UN Secretariat on facilitating Russian food and fertilizer exports, which Moscow treated as an inseparable part of the package.

This structure allowed Moscow and Kyiv to avoid signing with each other directly. Operationally, the deal worked as follows:

1. Commercial ships were registered with the JCC, which agreed their route and schedule.
2. Ukrainian pilots guided vessels out of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi along a maritime humanitarian corridor.
3. JCC inspection teams, with representatives of all four parties, checked inbound empty ships and outbound cargoes at anchorage near Istanbul, in Turkish waters, to ensure no weapons were carried and that cargoes matched declarations.
4. Russia and Ukraine committed not to attack vessels and port facilities involved in the initiative.

The World Food Programme also used the corridor for humanitarian cargoes, with the first WFP-chartered vessel sailing in August 2022 toward the Horn of Africa.

Prisoner exchanges and other channels

Türkiye's mediation was not limited to grain. It facilitated several humanitarian tracks, including prisoner exchanges and, in September 2022, an arrangement under which five Ukrainian commanders from the Azovstal garrison were transferred to Türkiye. In 2025, Istanbul again hosted direct Russia–Ukraine delegation talks (16 May, 2 June and 23 July), which produced agreements on prisoner and body exchanges, including a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner swap announced after the first round. These talks did not produce a ceasefire.

Key Players & Positions

United Nations

Guterres and the UN trade and relief officials designed the package and ran the UN side of the JCC. The UN consistently said that the grain corridor and the Russian-exports memorandum were two halves of one deal, and that it had worked with Moscow on obstacles such as payments, insurance and port access for Russian fertilizer. When Russia exited, the UN Secretary-General said he regretted the decision and warned about the effect on vulnerable consumers.

Russia

Moscow's stated position, voiced by President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin spokesperson and Foreign Minister Lavrov, was that the second half of the package, covering Russian agricultural and fertilizer exports, had not been delivered. Russian officials cited restrictions on banking, insurance, shipping and port access, and argued that the grain mostly went to wealthier countries rather than the poorest. Russia said it would return if its conditions were met.

Ukraine

Kyiv, including President Volodymyr Zelensky, treated the corridor as vital for its economy and for global food security. After Russia's withdrawal, Ukraine said it would seek to keep shipping and later opened its own temporary corridor along the western Black Sea coast. Ukrainian officials argued that Russia, not Ukraine, was responsible for ending the deal and for subsequent strikes on port infrastructure.

Other actors

The European Union, the United States and many importing countries supported the initiative and criticised its termination. Some Western governments and commentators also questioned whether Russia was seeking sanctions relief through the fertilizer track, while Moscow described its demands as implementation of what had been agreed.

Source Comparison

The table below summarises how different sources frame the initiative. These are generalisations, and individual outlets vary.

Readers can compare these claims against the primary documents: the texts of the initiative, the UN memorandum, JCC data, and official statements. For how Bloc Politics separates fact, position and source, see Editorial Principles: How Bloc Politics Separates Fact, Position and Source.

What to Watch

• Direct talks in Istanbul. Further Russia–Ukraine delegation rounds would likely again focus on humanitarian issues such as prisoners and the remains of the dead before political questions.
• Black Sea navigation safety. In January 2024, Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria launched a mine countermeasures task group to improve commercial navigation safety in the western Black Sea.
• Any revived grain arrangement. Russia has linked its return to its own export conditions; Ukraine and the UN argue for unconditional shipping security. Any new deal would again require agreement on inspections, insurance and guarantees against attacks.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Black Sea Grain Initiative: The July 2022 arrangement to export Ukrainian grain from three ports under joint inspection.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul-based body with Turkish, UN, Russian and Ukrainian staff that registered, scheduled and inspected ships.
• Montreux Convention (1936): The treaty regulating passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles; see The 1936 Montreux Convention Explained.
• Humanitarian diplomacy: Türkiye's practice of combining aid, mediation and access arrangements, also seen in Türkiye and Gaza: Humanitarian Diplomacy, Aid Efforts and Ankara's Position on Palestine.
• Strategic autonomy: Ankara's attempt to remain in NATO while keeping independent relations with Russia, Ukraine and the Global South; see Is Türkiye a Bridge Between Blocs?.

For claims circulating about Türkiye's role in the war, see Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Verified Against Primary Sources.

Perspective Note

Bloc Politics presents Türkiye's official positions and legal arguments alongside the wider international debate, and states clearly where an analysis reflects the Turkish perspective. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and government statements, so that readers can verify them independently.